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UNEMPLOYMENT DURATION AND THE RESTART
EFFECT: SOME EXPERIMENTAL EVIDENCE*
Peter Dolton and Donal O'Neill
III this paper we analyse the effect of ihe Restart programme in the United Kingdom. This
programme consisis of an interview of tbe long-term unemployed to counsel them on effective job
search. Failure to attend the interview carries the threat of the cessation of unemployment benefits.
The results, using experimental data, indicate that the programme has a significant effect of
reducing unemployment duration. Estimation of an independent competing risks model
distinguishing between exits from unemployment to: a job, a training placement or to signing-off
unemployment benefit shows that the channels through which Restart works differs according to
exit type.
The recent growth in the number of long-term unemployed, is viewed as one
of the most important problems facing the UK economy.* Various m-
terventionist government policies have been suggested to help unemployed
workers maintain a better link with the labour market. Some of the most recent
policies, including suggestions for a 'Jobseeker's Allowance' (HMSO, 1994),
focus on providing an additional incentive to the unemployed to seek work and
no longer claim unemployment benefit (UB). In this study we estimate the
extent to which one such scheme, the Restart programme, has succeeded in
helping the long-term unemployed return to the labour market.
Recent studies which attempt to evaluate the potential of government
schemes to reduce unemployment and to provide workers with the necessary
skills needed to maintain a strong link with the labour market, have
highlighted the problems posed by non-random selection into such pro-
grammes. The resulting sample selection bias can severely contaminate
estimates of the programme's effectiveness. The use of controlled experiments
has been advocated as a means of overcoming this problem.^ Our study allows
such an evaluation of the Restart effect since the analysis is based on a
controlled experiment, in which a purely random subset of the sample was
excluded from the scheme.^ The presence of such a control group allows us to
obtain unbiased estimates of the 'treatment effect' of the Restart programme
in altering the unemployment patterns of participants.
* We are grateful to Michael White, Jon Hales, the PSI and the SCPR for help in accessing the data and
lo Tony Atkinson, Audra Bowlus, Ken Burdetl, Guido Imbens, Tony Lancaster, Gerard Van den Berg,
Wilberl Van der Klaauw as well a.s two anonymous referees and seminar participanu at Newcastle
University, Dublin Economics Workshop and the EMRU Labour workshop for comments and suggestions.
Peter Dolton would like to ihank the ESRC for funding towards this research from research grant numbers
R000233909 and H519255006, This paper was written whilst O'Neill was at the University of Newcastle-
iipon-Tyne. We alone are responsible for any errors.
' Between 1979 and 1986 ihe proportion of unemployed who had been out of work for over a year rose
from 20% to around 40 "i in Britain,
' See LaLonde (1985),
' To our knowledge the data set used in this study is one of the first modern attempts to coUeet
experimental data in labour market potiey evaluation in the United Kingdom, We are aware only of the
work ofRoyston (1983) and (1984) using a DHSS sample and the work ofWhite and Lakey (1992) which
u,ses the same data as the present study.
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The Restart programme consists of a compulsory interview for each
unemployed person in the United Kingdom after they have been registered as
unemployed for 6 months. The interview with an official ofthe Employment
Office is designed to help unemployed people find a job and reduce their
dependency on unemployment benefits. In part it achieves this by placing
workers in contact with employers or training agencies. Hence, an important
part of the Restart process is the positive help and encouragement given to
unemployed job seekers by the way of advice, counselling and direct contact
with employers. Such positive intervention is commonplace in other OECD
countries. However, a crucial feature of Restart is that it also has a negative
threat component, in that the UB claimant is faced with the possibility of
having their benefits reduced or suspended if they do not attend the Restart
interview or are not deemed to be making genuine attempts to find a job. While
previous studies have looked at the effect of a change in the arrival rate of wage
offers, there have been (to our knowledge) few attempts to assess the effect of
a threat of unemployment benefits reduction on unemployment duration.
Several papers have modelled the effect of unemployment benefit regime
changes after a specified number of months, e.g. Meyer (1990), Katz and
Meyer (1990} or calculated the elasticity of reservation wages with respect to
benefits.^ However, unlike the present study, none were in a position to assess
the effect of a threat to suspend unemployment benefits.
In this paper we examine the channels through which Restart works by
distinguishing between the different possible routes out of unemployment and
examining the extent to which the Restart programme has a different impact
on distinct exit types. This is modelled as a competing risks exit process from
unemployment into: a job, a training placement or signing-off unemployment
benefits. Our findings show that the impact of Restart differs according to the
exit type. In particular, the results indicate that the receipt of a Restart
interview greatly increases the hazard to signing off, irrespective of when the
interview takes place, however, being in the control group (i.e. receiving the
interview 6 months later) may have a lasting negative effect on job prospects.
I. THE RESTART PROGRAMME IN I 989
The Restart programme was introduced by the government in April 1987 to
review the position of people experiencing long-term unemployment.^ In this
section we describe how the system worked at the time our data were collected.
The programme consisted of a set of six-monthly meetings between the
unemployed individual and a counsellor. During this interview the counsellor
assessed the claimant's recent unemployment history and offered advice on
benefits, search behaviour, training courses and In some instances initiated
direct contact with employers. The main aim of the Restart process was to
* See Lancaster and Ghesher {1983).
^ While the goals of the Restart programme in operation today are the same as those in 1987, the
programme has developed substantially sinee its introduction. In particular, today's system is a 'seamless'
process of continued appraisal ofthe unemployed person's job search, suitability for training and eligibility
for welfare. Further details are available in a Supplementary Appendix available from the authors upon
request.
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reduce the amount of time people spend unemployed and reduce claims of
unemployment benefit by those who were essentially not available for work or
who were not making the appropriate effort to find employment.
While the Restart process may have affected unemployed claimants in
several ways, a direct consequence of the process was the threat to reduce or
suspend a claimant's welfare receipts. The Child Poverty Handbook (1993)
describes the process thus:
' If you decline all offers of assistance, your case will be referred to an
adjudication officer who may decide either that you are not really
available for work or, if you have refused an ofTer of employment or
training, that you should be disqualified from benefit for a specific period.'
(page 17).
it goes on to suggest that:
'Looking for ajob can be difficult, depressing and frustrating experience
and many claimants find Restart interviews - and in particular having to
justify their attempts to find work to a person in authority under the threat
that their benefits may be stopped - very intimidating.' (page 17).
The process started with the Restart office sending a letter to each individual
approaching an unbroken period of six months claiming unemployment
benefit. This letter requested that the individual attend an interview at a stated
date and time. Interviews took place in Employment Service Job Centres and
lasted approximately 15-25 minutes. In some instances individuals were
excused attendance at the Restart interview mainly because they had already
obtained a job or a place on a training programme or had withdrawn their
benefit claim. On completing the interview the Restart counsellors then
recommended a course of action for that individual designed to help them in
their job search.
Attendance at the Restart interview was mandatory, in that it is a condition
of receiving benefits that claimants attend an employment interview when
asked to do so. Those who failed to attend the initial appointment were sent two
more letters requesting them to do .so. If they still had not attended an interview
by the time of the third letter their names were flagged at the Unemployment
Benefit Office and they were then required to attend a Restart interview and
to return with evidence of having done so, before they are allowed to sign on
to receive unemployment benefits.
II. DATA
In 1989 the Policy Studies Institute was commissioned by the Employment
Service to evaluate the impact of Restart. This study identified a sample of
individuals approaching their 6th month of unemployment in the period
March-July 1989 who were eligible for a Restart interview. A random sample
of 8,925 of these individuals was chosen to take part in the study. Individuals
were retained in the sample even if they subsequently did not attend a
scheduled interview, as such the sample is one of the inflow to Restart and not
the outflow from it. Every Employment Service office throughout Britain was
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contacted while constructing the sample in order to eliminate regional biases.
Individuals were selected for the sample from the inflow lists on the basis oi their
National Insurance {NI) numbers. The NI digit sequence used correspond to
those used by theJUVOS Cohort data base and is known to result in a random
5 % sample. Of this set a control group of 582 people was randomly chosen,
again by means of previously specified NI digit sequences. Members of the
control group, although eligible for an interview, were not asked to attend the
initial Restart interview. For each individual in the sample, data were collected
on personal characteristics such as sex, age as well as information on the Restart
interview and outcome. About 6 months after the Restart Interview, the survey
organisation. Social and Community Planning Research conducted a survey of
these individuals in which detailed information was obtained on subsequent
work history, personal characteristics, the Restart interview, previous em-
ployment history, job search behaviour and benefit income. Of the original
sample, 5,200 individuals completed this survey, which was conducted between
September and October 1989. Approximately half of the non-responses
resulted from an inability to contact the individual due to invalid address
records or death, whereas the other half refused to take part in the survey.^ Of
the 5,200 respondents, 4,565 satisfied the sampling criterion (i.e. an ongoing
spell of unemployment of approximately 6 months), of which 323 were
members of the control group. It is this sample which we use in this paper.
The structure ofthe sample was such that it could be linked to administrative
JUVOS data collected by the Employment Service, which provides accurate
records on the claimant's unemployment history dating back to January 1982
which can be used to analyse the impact of Restart on movements out of
unemployment.^ The survey also contained information on an individual's
travel to work area which was linked to the National Online Manpower
Information System (NOMIS) to obtain monthly data on local labour market
conditions dating back to August 1985. A description ofthe variables used in
this study, along with summary statistics are presented in the Data Appendix.
III. THE IMPACT OF RESTART ON THE DURATION OF UNEMPLOYMENT
One method of assessing the effect of Restart is to look at the median time in
unemployment of the control and treatment groups, which are 13 and 12
months respectively.* Hence, we find that members of the treatment group
have unemployment spells which are on average one month shorter than those
of individuals in the control group. This estimate of the impact of Restart
compares favourably with results of experiments carried out in the United
States which estimated reductions in unemployment duration ranging firom i
to 3 weeks. Woodbury and Spiegelman (1987) assess the impact of a
programme which involves paying a benefit bonus to unemployed people who
* While attrition from the original sample ran potentially lead to bias, estimates of a probit equation
determining .survey participation show that the decision to participate was independent of control group
status. As a result our estimates ofthe Restart effeet are likely to be unaffected by the attrition.
' We have also carried out thc analysis using self-reported data and obtained very similar results.
^ Using the median duration helps limit the impact of censoring on the results.
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obtain employment within ii weeks. They find that the scheme reduces
average unemployment duration by one week. Johnson and Klepinger {1994)
performed an econometric evaluation ofa scheme in which receipt of benefits
was tied to various work search requirements. They found shorter un-
employment durations when such a regime was enforced.
An alternative way of analysing the impact of Restart is to examine the
empirical hazard functions by control group status. The results shown in Fig. 1
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Fig. 1, Kaplan-Meier estimates of the hazard function for both control and treatment group (o).
provides further evidence supporting a role for Restart in reducing un-
employment duration.^ First, we note the striking difference in the hazard
functions for the control and treatment groups in the 5-6 months following the
initial Restart Interview. In particular, we see that over the period in which the
control group was excluded from the process, members of this group were only
about 70-80% as likely to exit unemployment as members of the treatment
group.^ ** Secondly, we notice a significant spike in the hazard function
approximately six months after the initial interview, which is consistent with
attendance at the Restart interview after a year's unemployment. At first sight
it may seem surprising that the spike is more pronounced for control group
members. However, we should remember that control group members were
only excluded from the first Restart. They did attend a Restart Interview after
a year's unemployment and to the extent that we believe the first meeting with
the Restart Counsellor to be the most effective, then the pattern in Fig. 1 is
what one would expect.^^
' In what follows we use thc zero (reference) duration point as the 6th month oi unemployment, since all
our sample have been unemployed for at least six months.
'" We have estimated confidence intervals for these hazard functions which support the differences
discussed in the text. However, in order to keep from cluttering thc figure we have not included them in
Fig. I-
' ' We have aisn estimated the effects of Restart by specifying a proportional hazards model with a flexihie
baseline hazard, allowing for the possibility of unobserved heterogeneity, ."^gain the results showed that
Restart significantly reduced unemployment duration {Dolton and O'Neill, 1995).
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IV. THE MULTIPLE EXIT FRAMEWORK OF THE RESTART PROCESS
While these results suggest a role for Restart in reducing the duration of
unemployment they provide no evidence on the channels through which the
programme works. To do this we distinguish between movements off the
register into employment and movements into non-participation. The first may
be associated wilh the guidance and help received from the Restart coun.sellors,
while the latter may result from failing to meet the benefit eligibility criteria
specified at the Restart office. In our empirical work we identify three exit
states, employment, training and fulltime education and out of the labour
force.^ ^ In a competing risk framework the observed exit time or duration t^ is
characterised by both a censoring indicator and an exit type indicator. In the
case oi K mutually exclusive and exhaustive destination states or exit types, let
the random variable C^C =' i,... ,K represent the exit type. Then at each point
in time we can describe the exit process in terms of A' transition intensities
defined as
= lim
The total hazard rate h{t) is then the sum of all K transition intensities at time
I
It is common to think of a model with multiple destinations as a model in
which the transition intensities are the hazard functions of A^  independent
destination-.specific latent duration or survival times. The actual exit time and
exit type can then be interpreted as realisations of random variables T and C
defined as
T=miniT';k=i,...,K], (2)
C=-argmin^(r^A= i,...,K), (3)
where the independent random variables 7"^ 7"^,..., 7*^  are the latent
durations, representing the length of stay before an exit of type k occurs in the
absence of all other types of exit risks. With only C and T being observed, this
model is often referred to as an independent competing risks model. We will
assume that each of the transition intensities are of the proportional hazard
type with
Af(/) =h'{t)^xp[X,{ty^,l k=i,...,K. (4)
Consider the case of 3 exit types [K = 3) and the grouped interval data
analysed here. Then under the assumption that the durations T^, T^ and T^
are independent (conditional on X), it is possible by applying monotonic
transformations of the variables to show that for censored observations
Prob (T^ > t,, r > /„ T^ > t,) = Prob {e,, > J,,6,, > J,,E,, > J,), (5)
w h e r e j ^ = - l o g ?'^''">'^^A^(«) rfw, for j = 1 ,2 ,3 .
J
" It is relatively straightforward to adopt (he three state model of Burdett etal. (1984) in order to capture
the essence of the Restart process.
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and Gj, Ga and e^  are independently distributed extreme value errors {see Han
and Hausman (iggo)). Similarly, the probability of observing a complete
duration /,• with exit type c for individual / is
Prob{/, ^ T<t,-\-i,C, = c)
= Prob[-log r'^  r(tt)^ *'"'''^ rf« < e., < -log r r
for £•,/:= 1,2,3 3nd c ^  k, where ^(6^;) represent.s the value of e^ .^  such that
duration T" implied by that e^  through e^ . = — log j^ A*{u) e^ f'"*'^ *du equals the
duration 7"'^  similarly implied hy e^ .
Notice that the probability in (6) is bounded between Prob (/^  ^ T*^  < /^+ i,
T" > t,] and Prob {t, ^ T ' < /j+ i, T* > /,+ i). In the case of continuous
duration data (i.e. not grouped by interval), the relevant probability will be
Prob {tl ^ T" < /(-I-A, T" > t^) which is equal to the product of the probability
of an exit of type c in interval (/j,/j + A) times the probability that the duration
T" was censored at time t^. Accordingly the likelihood consisting of terms like
(5) and (6) can be factored into separate components for each risk where
failures of the alternative type are treated as censored observations for exit of
other types. This implies that hazard functions h-^{t)y h^it) and h^{t) can be
estimated in the same way single risk models are estimated, by treating exits of
other types as censored observations. A similar procedure is possible using
group data, if one assumes a particular form for the hazard function inside each
interval.
V. EMPIRICAL RESULTS FOR THE COMPETING RISKS MODEL
In modelHng the different types of exit out of unemployment in the manner set
out in Section IV, we also wish to model explicitly two additional
considerations. The first is an attempt to capture the role of the Restart in
changing the arrival rates of offers. We allow for this in our estimation by
including two .separate variables in our estimation, which measure whether the
person received either a job offer, or a training offer, directly as a result of the
Restart process.^^
The second additional feature which we will model involves a complication
in the experimental design. In deriving the results presented in Section III we
ireated the people not called for a Restart interview as a conventional 'control'
group and those who received the interview as a 'treatment' group. However,
there is one crucial respect in which the people in the control group are not like
a classical experimental control group. In our experiment the 'control' group
are only excluded from the first Restart interview at 6 months of
unemployment, but they do receive the subsequent Restart interviews at 12
and 18 months of unemployment, provided they remain unemployed. This
'^ h is worth noting that receiving an offer did not necessarily imply that the individual accepted the job
or training place.
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means that to some extent we should also test whether our 'contror group
become like the 'treatment' group after they receive their first Restart
interview at 12 months. We can examine this hypothesis by constructing a
time-varying variable which takes the value of i only when the person has had
their first Restart interview. This means that members of the control group
have a value of o for this variable up until month 6 (unemployment duration
of 12 months), when they have their first Restart interview - provided they do
not get into ajob before this time. The treatment group have a value of i for
this variable from date i, i.e. from the date at which they get their first Restart
interview at 6 months of unemployment.^'* This time varying covariate has
another useful property, in that its inclusion in the hazard function along with
the dummy variable indicating membership of the control group, provides a
direct test for the validity ofthe proportionality assumption. More specifically;
if we find only the variable control to be significant in our estimated hazard
function then this implies that the effect of the treatment has a lasting
proportional effect; in contrast if we find only the time varying variable
interview tv to be significant, this means that the control group are only distinct
from the treatment group for the period of 6-12 months unemployment and
after they have received their first Restart interview they become indis-
tinguishable from the treatment group; if both effects are significant then the
interpretation is that both the short term and longer run effects of the
treatment are significant.
Our results for the independent competing risks Cox proportional hazards
model are presented in Table i. For clarity we discuss mainly the preferred
specifications.^^ The results justify the use of the competing risks model, as
distinct factors play an important role in infiuencing the probability of exiting
from unemployment depending on exit type. The modelling considerations
introduced above of: the proxy variables for the arrival rate of offers and the
experimental design complication, necessitating the use of a time-varying
covariate also prove to provide significant insights into the process by which
individuals leave unemployment. The other conditioning variables have the
expected signs with the presence of a working partner reducing the probabihty
of exiting unemployment, while good local labour market conditions and
education increase the likelihood of ending a spell of unemployment. The effect
of the predicted benefit ievel^ ^ is also clear in that higher levels of predicted
** In principle the same argument would suggest that the variables joA offer and training offer be inrluded
as time varying rcgressors. However, this is no( possible as information on the job and training offers received
at the 12 months Restart interview was not available for our sample.
'* For each eidt type we estitiiated an unrestricted model which included both control and interview tv and
a restricted model in which the coefficient on inlemiew tv was set equal to zero. The reported equations are
those preferred based on the relevant likelihood ratio tests. Details ofthe likelihood function values and the
alternative estimates ofthe coefficients of interest are provided in Table A i.
" It was necessary to use predicted benefits as actual benefits were missing on those who left
unemployment between the Reslart interview and the survey date. The equation used lo predict benefit
levels is reported in a supplementary appendix available from the authors on request. The equation is
identified by an exclusion restriction relating to the variable indicating whether the person was living alone.
Clearly, such a variable affects benefits but one would not expect such a variable, a priori on its own, (given
that family status, and active partner are included as controlhng regressors) to influence unemployment
duration.
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benefits reduce the probability of exiting unemployment. While these are
important issues, in this paper we wish to concentrate on the role of Restart in
reducing unemployment.
To understand the implications of our results for Restart we consider first the
coefficients for the 'training' exit from unemployment. The results suggest that
the use of either the control dummy or the time-varying covariate are
insignificant in the determination of the hazard of unemployment exit to
training. The main reason for this result becomes clear when we examine the
coefficient of the training offer variable, which suggests that the predominant
influence on exits to training is the receipt of a training offer. This result clearly
makes sense and suggests that propensity to exit to training is mainly
conditioned on such an offer and its timing is not greatly influenced by being
in the control group over and above the reception of such offers. The table also
provides details of the other significant positive influences on this exit
probability which are: being male, young, married or divorced with children
(who are not younger than school age), not having a partner in work, not
having a driving licence and living in rented accommodation.
The estimated coefficients for the 'signing-off' exit indicate that the time
varying variable associated with having had an interview, interview tv^ is
positively significantly in the hazard, while the control variable is insignificant.
The implication of this finding is that the effect of being in the control group
for the signing-off exit is not proportional. Hence we may deduce that the
effect on the hazard for signing-off is crucially dependent on the timing of the
first Restart interview. More specifically, having the first interview gives a large
and positively significant boost to the hazard for signing-off unemployment. An
interpretation of this finding is that there exists a group of unemployment
benefit claimants, who if challenged about their availability for work, would
end up signing off - since they are not really eligible for work. In this instance
the Restart interview, and associated entitlement check, will identify these
individuals irrespective of when the interview takes place, leading to a jump in
the number moving off the register.
There are other interesting differences in the effects of the controlling
regressors for the signing-off exit compared to the 'training' exit and the 'job'
exit. The most important of these effects is that the people who sign off are
much more likely to be women and they are much less likely to have received
any offers of training course placements. In contrast men are much more likely
than women to exit unemployment to a job or a training placement. Since
gender is clearly working in a different way for distinct exits we also estimated
our equations separately for men and women. Unfortunately there are only 90
women in the control group and the data proved insufficient to support any
significant control group effects. The results for the males only equations for the
main variables of interest are reported in Table A i. They provide very similar
conclusion to those discussed for the whole sample.
Results for the job exit regime presented in the first column of Table i
indicate that the effect of being in the control group is proportional and
significant, i.e. the interpretation is that the assignment to the control group
<S> Royal Economic Society 1996
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Table i »
Independent Competing Risks Cox Proportional Hazard Regression
Regressor
Benefit entitlement
Control
Interview tv
Job offer
Training offer
Sex
'4£<45
^g'55
Married
Divorced
Dependent children
Toddlers
Local unemployment
Inner city
Race
Education
Driver
LA house
Rent house
Other house
Past unemployment
Active partner
Log likelihood
Number of observations
chi squared (23)
Job exit
coefficient (s.E.)
— 0-151 ^3**
{0-00793)
-0-28441**
(0-12443)
—
0-561 43 • •
(O''4595)
— 1-0509**
(0-15248)
0-61984**
(0-07469)
0-7274**
(0-09087)
0-56259**
(0-10866)
-0-05575
(0-10931)
-1-4806**
(0-13552)
3-8003**
(0-22142)
I 0016**
(0-13139)
1-340**
(0-08262)
— 0-70279**
(0-07954)
1-8098**
(0-49728)
-O-21828*'
(0-0818)
0-26945
(0-239 io)
0-25665**
(0-06322)
0-37684**
(0-06237)
0-8308**
(0-100 08)
1-1402**
(0-12344)
-Q-52045**
(0-2360)
-0-49735 '*
(0-12604)
-5-1103**
(0-30564)
- ioi75 'oi3
4,728
729'98
Training exit
coefficient (s.E.)
— 0-160 01 * *
(o-oi623)
—33804
(o'2i6ai)
—
-0-36097
(0-50519)
1-9608**
(0-10225)
074867**
(0-13887)
0-751 28**
(0-15472)
0-78045**
(0-1812)
— 000789
(0-19915)
- 1 7 6 7 8 * *
(0-31539)
3-3371**
(0-41680)
0-66565**
(O'2i854)
1.536**
(o'16021)
-0-67133**
(0-13821)
1-3869
(0-93107)
0-07749
(0-12752)
00728
(0-38604)
01543
(0-10547)
-0-23713**
(0-10950)
I'402 4**
(0-21599)
1-5944**
(0-24857)
-0-88571
(0-58308)
— 0-25768
(0-20433)
-5-9025**
(O'6i2 85)
-3193-5698
4,728
551-27
Signing-off exit
coefficienl (s.E.)
— 0-10627**
(0-011 70)
0-3892
(0-2828)
0-72438**
(0-3573)
-0-82175
(0-45207)
-0-44630**
(0-19915)
— 0-28251**
(0-11468)
0-4061**
(0-14874)
0-39140**
(0-17526)
— 0-01024
(0-17557)
0-06254
(0-1805)
3-0891 * *
(0-33352)
1-261 3**
(0-20322)
0-74044**
(0-13137)
0-09405
(0-11735)
1-5687**
(0-76659)
-0-19045
(0-1276)
0-16446
(0-35920)
-0-08088
(0-09525)
0-070 74
(0-09527)
0-59911**
(0-13207)
0-77163**
(0-18720}
-0-39695
(0-36591)
— 0-67230**
(0-20592)
-3-3400**
(0-44827)
-4309-03
4,728
482-51
Asymptotic standard errors are given in parentheses.
** Indicates signiticance at i % level.
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has a lasting proportional downward shift on the baseline hazard. A
specification in which the time varying covariate was excluded could not be
rejected indicating that the effect does not dissipate after 6 months. One
interpretation of thi.s finding is that if an individual is assigned to a group which
does not have a Restart interview at 6 months then this has a lasting effect on
unemployment, i.e. the ground lost to those who received the interview at 6
month.s of unemployment is not made up subsequently. From this it would
appear, that in terms of possible exits into a job, the opportunity of a first
Restart interview at 12 months is not a satisfactory substitute for the same
interview 6 months earlier. One possible explanation for this result is that
employers look on potential employees who have had 12 months unemployment
as significantly less 'employable' than their counterparts who present
themselves for interview at a much earlier stage in their unemployment history.
VI. CONCLUSION
In this paper we examine the impact ofthe Restart programme in reducing
unemployment duration. The data used in this paper are well suited to this type
oianalysis, in that they include a randomly assigned control group, members of
whi( h were excluded from the Restart process. The availability of a control
group helps overcome the sample-selection issues which have hindered
previous attempts to evaluate government intervention in various areas e.g.
training programmes. The results of our paper show that interventionist
government policy can lead to a substantial reduction in time spent
unemployed in the short run.
Examining the time spent unemployed by individuals we find that inclusion
in the Restart process significantly decreases the probability of remaining
unemployed over the sample period. To do this we estimate a competing risk
model with three different types of exit from unemployment: job exits, training
exits and signing-off UB, exits. The empirical estimates suggest that the
hazards associated with exits to these separate states are very distinct.
Specifically, we find that the effect of the Restart interview on exit from
unemployment into training is small if one includes a proxy for the arrival rate
of training offers. Exit to the state of 'not signing-on' seems to be common
amongst women and other groups who are most likely not to be genuinely
available lor work. Our estimation found that the Restart interview scared
these people into signing-off and that the timing of this exit was most clearly
associated with their first Restart interview which acted as a check on work
availability. Hence., it was no surprise to find that control group's first interview
at 12 months of unemployment was most comparable to the treatment group's
first interview at 6 months of unemployment.
Perhaps the most important finding of the competing risks model was to
establish that the hazard for exit to a job is significantly different for the
treatment and control groups over the 18 month period ofthe study. The
implication of this finding is that exclusion from an initial Restart interview
would seem to have a lasting (proportional) detrimental effect on the control
© Royal Economic Society 199G
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group's conditional probability of exit from unemployment to a job. This
finding raises an important question of whether conducting an experiment
which permanently effects someone's lifetime prospects is ethically justifiable.
University of Newcastle-upon- Tyne
Maynooth College, Co Kildare
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DATA APPENDIX. VARIABLE DESCRIPTION
Means for control group and treatment group respectively are given in parentheses
Inner City: Inner City identifier (i = inner city) (o'22o, 0-179).
Sex: Sex (i = male, o = female) (0-679, ^'^Ib)-
Past Unemployment: Proportion ofthe individuals working life since 1982 which was
spent in unemployment, calculated from JUVOS data. (0-390, 0-391).
Duration: Continued duration of current unemployment spell (months) beyond the
sample date, calculated from JUVOS. (13, 12).
Dep. Kids: Total number of dependent children (aged less than 16). (0-508, 0517).
Toddler: Total number of toddlers (aged less than 5) (0-259, 0-286).
Local Unempl: For each 1978 job centre travel to work area (jcitwa) this measures the
percentage decline in unemployment between 1988 and 1990 (Log of average
local unemployment in 1988-Log of average local unemployment in 1990).
(0-347, O'34S) We use the difference in unemployment levels as a measure of local
labour market conditions as unemployment rates are not available from NOMIS
for the 1978 jcttwa.
Control: Restart sub-group (i = control).
Driver: Do you hold a current drivers licence (i = yes) (0-516, 0-498).
Married: Married (i = yes) (0-451, 0-472).
Divorced: Divorced/separated/widowed (i = yes) (0-131, o-ioi).
Race: Race of respondent (1 = white) (0-971, 0-980).
Education: Any academic or technical qualification. (1 = yes) (0-562, 0-550).
Active Partner: Partner working (full or part-time) (i = ye.s) (0-250, 0-223).
Benefit Entitlement: Predicted benefit entitlement. {£\2-o,^, ;^4379)-
Rent House: Rent house from Housing Association etc. (privately) (i = yes) (0-12,
0095).
LA House: Rents accommodation from Local Authority (i = yes) (0-25, 0-241).
Own House: Own/buying house on mortgage (0-30, 0-30).
Other House: Other form of accommodation other than homeowner, renting from Local
Authority or renting privately (e.g. living rent free, squatting.) (i = yes) (0-017,
o-oi).
Interview tv: Time varying covariate taking the value zero in months preceding the first
Restart interview and one thereafter.
Job Offer: Did you receive a job offer as result ofthe Restart interview (i = yes) (00,
0-02).
Training Offer: Did you receive an offer of a place on a training scheme as a result of
the Restart interview (i = yes) (o, 0-11).
Age 25: A dummy variable taking the value i if the individual is aged between 25 and
35. Similar definitions apply to Age3^ and Age 45 while Age55 indicates individuals
aged 55 or over.
Note: The reference groups for the age and housing dummy variables used in Table
A I, were whether the individual was aged less than 25 and whether or not the
individual owned their own house.
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Table A i
Alternative Specifications of the Hazard along with the Results for Males only
Exit Slate
Job exit
Log likelihood
Training exit
Log likelihood
Signing-off exit
Log likelihood
Variable name
Control
Interview Iv
Job offer
Training offer
Control
Interview tv
Job offer
Training offer
Control
Interview tv
Job offer
Training offer
—
—
(I) All
-0-2844**
(0-0079)
—
0-5614**
(O-M595)
— 1-0509**
(0-15248)
-10175-013
0-33804
{0-2162}
—
-0-36097
(0-50519)
1-9608**
(O-IO225)
-3193-57
— O' 11 1 2
(0-1735)
—
— 0-8129*
(0-4531)
-0-4436**
(0-1992)
-4310-97
4.565
i'2) All
-0-2059
(0-3263)
0-0912
(O-3526)
0-5610**
(0-1460)
—1-0511**
(0-1525)
—10174-98
0-8429*
(0-4347)
0-6288
(0-4959)
-0-3647
(0-5052)
I-9590**
(0-1023)
-3192-84
0-3893
(0-2829)
0-7244**
(0-3573)
-0-8218*
(0-4521)
— 0-4463**
(0-1992)
-4309-03
4.565
([) Males
-0-2931*
(0-1578)
—
0-6102**
(0-1811)
—1-0764**
(0-1902)
— 6112 63
0-4626*
(0-2448)
—
—0-3640
(0-5845)
3-9658**
(0-1215)
-2184-81
0-1056
(0-2466)
—
-1-2833
(1-0056)
— 0-1081
(0-2715)
—1862-23
3.076
{•2) Males
-0-3105
(0-4605)
— 0-0197
(0-4895)
0-6103**
(0-1811)
— 1-0764**
(0-1902)
— 6112-63
1-009**
(0-4802)
0-6870
(<''55i3)
-0-3688
(0-5845)
1-9635**
(0-1215)
— 2184-10
0-8399**
(0-3444)
••3557**
(0-4983)
- 1 -3008
(1-0056)
-0-1151
(0-2714)
- 1858-58
3.076
Standard errors are given in parentheses.
* Indicates significance m the 5% level.
** Indicates significance at the 1 % level.
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